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Abstract 
 
To create a more practical model for comparing the long-run impact of environmental 
taxes and subsidies on an industry using partial equilibrium analysis, this paper 
examines the long-run impact of (1) a CO2 tax, (2) subsidies for CO2 emissions 
reduction (e.g., favourable tax treatment for investment in equipment with advanced 
technology that can reduce real CO2 emissions) and (3) CO2 emissions trading on the 
foundry industry, which is a supporting industry for the machinery industry (e.g,, 
automobile) both domestically and globally. Energy intensity is considered as a key 
parameter indicating the state of energy conservation technology for equipment. The 
model was used to estimate the possibilities of (1) analysing the above 3 measures 
within the same framework, (2) a serious impact on the Japanese foundry industry by 
the CO2 tax, (3) global and local reductions in industrial CO2 emissions by a subsidy, 
(4) serious difficulties in the implementation of emissions trading, (5) CO2 emissions 
trading having basically the same impact as the tax or subsidy, (6) increases in global 
industrial CO2 emissions by a tax introduced in industrialised countries only.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Hanley, Shogren and White (2007, pp. 100) and Lee (2004) reported that environmental 
subsidies are found in many countries. However, as noted by Niizawa (1997), few 
articles have been written on this subject, although Baumol and Oats (1998, Ch. 14) and 
Hanley, Shogren and White (2007, Ch. 4) have compared the impact of environmental 
taxes and subsidies on an industry in the long run using partial equilibrium analysis. In 
the present study, I attempt to: (1) modify the model and analysis presented by Baumol 
and Oats (1998, Ch. 14) and Hanley, Shogren and White (2007, Ch. 4) for more 
practical application; (2) focus on global climate change perspectives; (3) simplify the 
existing model, especially concerning equipment technology deployment, which seems 
to be critically important; (4) include emissions trading in the model; (5) apply the 
model to a specific industry (i.e., the foundry industry1, a supporting industry for the 
machinery industry), in which I have experience as a policymaker at the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) of the Japanese government2; (5) analyse the 
possible impact of policy differences among countries.   
                                                  
1Another name for this industry is the casting industry. 
2I was in charge of the Japanese foundry industry from February 1987 to October 1988, at which 
time METI was known as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). 
 3
The aim of this study is to analyse the possible impact of environmental taxes, 
subsidies and emissions trading on the foundry industry in the long run, both 
domestically and globally, using partial equilibrium analysis. Before explaining the 
model, an overview of the foundry industry in Japan is provided in the next section. 
 
2. Overview of the foundry industry in Japan3 
 
The foundry industry, a supporting industry for the machinery industry, is a parts (e.g., 
automobile engines) provider positioned between upstream (steel, coke) and 
downstream (automobile, machine tool) industries. The foundry industry consists 
primarily of numerous small-sized enterprises (1,054 establishments in 2005), most of 
which are subcontractors. For example, in 2005, about 70% of foundry production was 
from establishments with less than 100 employees, and more than 90% of foundry 
establishments had less than 100 employees. A significant feature of this industry is its 
low profit ratio. For example, in 2004, the ratio of operating profit to sales for the 
foundry industry was 3.2%, which was much lower than manufacturing average of 6.2%, 
the steel average of 13.2%, or the automobile industry average of 5.1%. Due to its low 
profit ratio and lack of funds, technological development and equipment investment in 
the foundry industry tends to be delayed4, despite the fact that it belongs to the process 
industry, where equipment (i.e., foundry machinery) plays a critical role. Another 
important feature of this industry is its high energy intensity5.   
 
3. Model and analysis of possible domestic and global impacts of environmental 
taxes, subsidies and emissions trading on the foundry industry  
 
3.1 Defining the model 
 
Since this paper focuses on global climate change, externalities refer to carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions. Long-run analysis was chosen because it is generally considered more 
important than short-run. The reasons for partial equilibrium analysis include: (1) its 
                                                  
3 The information in this section is taken from METI (2006)(a), METI (2006)(b), the Japan Foundry 
Association (2006) and the Japan Foundry Machinery Manufacturers’ Association (2006). Although 
my experience in the industry took place about 20 years ago, many key features seem to be 
unchanged.  
4 To be more precise, disparity among firms in this industry has been increasing. As noted by 
Hashimoto (2008), strong firms have been able to invest in equipment, while weak firms have 
difficulty in doing so. 
5 Energy intensity means energy consumption per unit of production. 
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simplicity and clarity; (2) the small size of the foundry product market6; (3) the fact that 
the prices of other goods (e.g., automobiles) tend not to be influenced by changes in the 
foundry product market, not only because the industry is small but also because its 
related industries (e.g., automobiles and steel) are much more powerful than the foundry 
industry itself. Competitive industry is assumed because: (1) there are a large number of 
firms, as noted in Sec. 2; (2) the firms appear to be price takers, at least partially, 
because of the power structure stated above; (3) entry and exit seem to be relatively 
free; and (4) product differentiation appears to be difficult (i.e., if product differentiation 
was easy, foundry firms would have a low likelihood of suffering from low profit). 
 
3.2 Type of measures considered 
 
The type of environmental tax considered is a CO2 tax, as a real environmental tax 
proposed by the Japanese Ministry of the Environment (MOE)7 which is also consistent 
with the focus of global climate change, as stated in Sec. 3.1. 
This type of environmental subsidy is a payment to a firm based on its CO2 
emissions reductions from base emissions. A typical existing subsidy for the foundry 
industry is favourable tax treatment for investment in equipment (e.g., foundry 
machinery) with advanced technology which can reduce CO2 emissions8 by energy 
conservation. For example, if a firm buys a designated foundry machine which costs 4 
million yen9 (about 40,000 US dollars), it is entitled to either a tax reduction of 280,000 
yen (about 3,000 US dollars) or a special depreciation of 1.2 million yen (about 12,000 
US dollars). This can be translated as either a 7% tax reduction or a 30% special 
depreciation for an equipment investment cost, as stated in the Energy Conservation 
Center, Japan (ECCJ) (2008). I tend to think that payments to a firm based on CO2 
emission reductions from base emissions may be used as approximation of the above 
typical existing subsidy, because utilising this subsidy would bring about increased 
                                                  
6 Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) reported that a small product market comparing with the 
whole economy can be illustrated by partial analysis. 
7 The MOE (2005) defines environmental taxes as CO2 tax. Although the specific framework of the 
MOE is taxes on fossil fuel usage based on carbon contents, for simplicity, the CO2 tax was used as 
an approximation of these taxes in the present model. Additionally, although the MOE has not 
specifically mentioned taxation of the foundry industry, such taxation cannot be ruled out in the long 
run. 
8 The Japan Foundry Machinery Manufacturers’ Association (2006, pp. 16) proposes a 20% CO2 
emission reductions in the future by introducing foundry machinery with advanced energy 
conservation technology. 
9 METI (2006)(b), pp. 188) gives the average price of a foundry machine as 3 million yen (about 
30,000 US dollars); a designated machine with advanced technology is likely to be more expensive. 
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investment in designated foundry machinery with advanced technology, and thus 
increased CO2 emissions reductions.10 
The type of emissions trading considered is allocation to the foundry industry, 
which is a downstream allocation11. Free allocation, which is either the benchmark 
(allocation based on industry-specific emission intensity) or grandfathering (allocation 
based on past emissions record) methods, is considered; these methods are also utilized 
by the MOE (2008, pp. 9). Auction is not considered, because it would impose an 
excessive cost burden12 on the foundry industry, which consists mainly of small-sized 
firms and already suffers from a low profit ratio. One of the serious difficulties expected 
in the implementation of emissions trading is the difficulty in allocating allowances 
fairly, for several reasons13. Under the benchmark method, weak firms (see Note 4) 
would be unable to comply, due to a large apparent difference between the benchmark 
intensity and their current intensity, while strong firms could easily achieve the 
benchmark and then sell emission allowances. Under the grandfathering method, 
however, weak firms could comply because such firms have already been operating 
inefficiently due a delay in technological equipment investment. Additionally, because 
of expected compliance, which could bring additional revenue from the sale of 
allowances, funds for introducing equipment with advanced emissions-reducing 
technology might be easier to obtain for weaker firms, while the past emissions 
reduction efforts of strong firms may go unacknowledged. Another expected serious 
difficulty would be the cost of implementation, which could be substantial due to the 
number of enterprises comprising the foundry industry14, although industry associations 
and/or cooperative societies, especially at the regional level, could contribute to solving 
this problem. It could be argued that small-sized enterprises can be excluded from 
emissions trading.However, since about 70% of production comes from establishments 
with less than 100 employees, and since over 90% of establishments have less than 100 
employees, this would exclude the vast majority of the industry. As a result, emissions 
                                                  
10 According to Kishimoto (1998), when an emission reduction is in proportion to investment in 
equipment, a favourable tax treatment on investment can be regarded as approximation of subsidies 
for emission reduction. 
11 Here, downstream means downstream of energy flow, i.e., the final consumption stage, which is 
different from the definition given in Sec. 2. All of the industries mentioned in Sec. 2 are 
downstream. The MOE (2008, pp. 12) suggests that upstream allocation may in fact result in lower 
motivation to reduce emissions. 
12 MOE (2008, pp. 9). 
13 Hashimoto (2008). 
14 While the MOE (2008, pp. 14) might not be currently considering allocation to the foundry 
industry in its Option 2 (Downstream Allocation) (End-Use of Electricity), the possibility of its 
introduction in the long run cannot be ruled out. 
 6
trading would likely be ineffective.  
 
3.3 Basic framework  
The relationship between output, energy intensity, emission coefficient and CO2 
emissions can be written as follows. 
       s = cgq15                                                    (1) 
where s = CO2 emissions 
c = CO2 emission coefficient  
g = energy intensity 
q = output of foundry product 
For simplicity, no fuel switching (e.g., from coal to gas) is assumed. Therefore, the 
emissions coefficient would be the same in each case stated below. As a result, energy 
intensity, which could indicate energy conservation16 technology for equipment, plays a 
critical role in the analysis.  
Assuming that a profit-maximizing firm belonging to the foundry industry is subject 
to a fixed CO2 tax per unit of emissions, its profit function is  
     π = pq-c(q)-ts = pq-c(q)-tcgtq                                     (2)17 
where 
p = given price 
c(q) = total cost for producing q (fixed cost is not distinguished18.) 
t = CO2 tax per unit of emissions 
gt = energy intensity with the tax 
If the firm is entitled to subsidies when the subsidy ratio is v, its profit function is  
    π = pq-c(q)+v(s-s) = pq-c(q)-vs+vs = pq-c(q)-vcgvq+vs                  (3)19 
where 
v = subsidy per unit of CO2 emission reduction 
gv = energy intensity with the subsidy 
s = base emissions against which reduction is calculated 
                                                  
15 IEEJ (2004). 
16 Ito, Murota, Morita and Hoshino (2000, pp. 15) noted that energy conservation can contribute to 
CO2 emissions reduction more than the introduction of renewables, which can be viewed as fuel 
switching. 
17 Baumol and Oats (1998, pp. 214) and Hanley, Shogren and White (2007, pp. 87). The main 
difference from these studies is the explicit inclusion of energy intensity and the emission coefficient 
in the present analysis. In addition, for simplicity, I have explicitly excluded Baumol and Oats’ 
abatement cost. 
18 Varian (1992) stated that “all costs are variable in the long run”. 
19 Baumol and Oats (1998, pp. 215) and Hanley, Shogren and White (2007, pp. 97), with the same 
difference as for Note 17. 
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   If the firm is subject to emissions trading and can sell emissions allowances when 
the price is rc in the event of compliance, its profit function is  
    π = pq-c(q)+rc(sr-s) = pq-c(q)-rc s+rc sr = pq-c(q)-rc cgcq+rc sr              (4)20 
where 
rc = price of emissions allowance in the event of compliance 
sr = initial allocation of emissions allowance 
gc = energy intensity with emissions trading in the event of compliance 
If the firm is subject to emissions trading but has to pay a charge when charge per 
unit of excess emissions is rn in the event of non-compliance, its profit function is  
  π = pq-c(q)-rn(s-sr)=pq-c(q)- rn s+rnsr= pq-c(q)-rn cgnq+rnsr                   (5) 
where 
rn = charge per unit excess emissions 
gn = energy intensity with emissions trading in the event of non-compliance 
For simplicity, and to make the comparison of each case easier, the following 
assumption is made. 
t= v = rc= rn21 22 and s = sr                                              (6) 
Equations (3) and (4) indicate that if the energy intensity is the same, the profit 
function of the subsidy is the same as that of emissions trading in the event of 
compliance. 
Marginal and average costs without measures are as follows. 
MC = c’(q) and AC = c(q)/q                                            (7)23 
Marginal and average costs with the tax are as follows. 
MCt = c’(q)+tcgt an ACt = c(q)/q+ts/q = c(q)/q+ tcgt                         (8)24 
Marginal and average costs with the subsidy are as follows. 
MCv = c’(q)+vcgv and ACv = c(q)/q+v(s-s)/q = c(q)/q+vcgv-vs/q               (9)25 
Marginal and average costs with emissions trading in the event of compliance are 
as follows. 
MCc = c’(q)+ rcc gc  
and ACc = c (q)/q+rc(s-s)/q = c(q)/q+rc cgc-rc s/q                            (10) 
                                                  
20 Taken from Kiyono (2007), who defines profit function using the equation π = px-C(x,z)-r(z-z), 
where market price of the product is p, total cost of production is C, unit price of emissions 
allowance is r, amount of emissions is z, and initial allocation of emissions allowance is z.  
21 The MOE (2008, pp. 6) states that the charge should be sufficiently high compared to the 
allowance price in the event of compliance.  
22 Unfortunately, due to this assumption, the possible problems with price fluctuation in the case of 
emissions trading indicated by METI (2008) cannot be analysed. 
23 Hanley, Shogren and White (2007, pp. 99).   
24 Ibid. The present model explicitly includes energy intensity and emission coefficient. 
25 Ibid. 
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Marginal and average costs with emissions trading in the event of non-compliance 
are as follows. 
MCn = c’(q)+rn cgn 
and ACn = c(q)/q+rn (s-s)/q = c(q)/q+rn cgn-rns/q                            (11) 
The difference between Eqs. (10) and (11) is that the sign of rc(s-s)/q becomes 
minus, while the sign of rn (s-s)/q becomes plus. 
Since the tax and emissions trading in the event of non-compliance tend to 
exacerbate the foundry industry’s characteristic low profit and lack of funds, especially 
given a high energy price, the introduction of new equipment with advanced energy 
conservation technology would be very difficult. Therefore, the following assumptions 
are made. 
g= gt = gn                                                           (12) 
However, in the case of a typical subsidy, which is a tax incentive, new equipment 
with advanced technology that improves energy intensity is introduced. This kind of 
subsidy tends to provide more funds to firms.26. Additionally, in the case of emissions 
trading in the event of compliance, the introduction of new equipment could be 
facilitated to reach compliance. Due to expected revenue from the sale of emissions 
allowances, funds for the introduction of equipment may also be easier to obtain. 
Therefore, the following assumptions are made. The gv = gc assumption is made for 
simplicity. 
g = gt = gn>gv = gc                                                                             (13) 
 
3.4 Domestic Analysis  
3.4.1 Possible impact of the tax 
Figure 1 illustrates long-run impact of the tax on the Japanese foundry industry.27 28 The 
chart on the left provides a firm-level analysis. As Eqs. (7) and (8) indicate, the tax 
shifts both marginal and average costs upward. Due to this shift, the exit of firms would 
take place until economic profit becomes zero (ACt = Pt). As a result of this exit, qti 
(industrial output with tax) would be smaller than qi (industrial output without tax), as 
                                                  
26 Komiya and Yokobori (1990) argued that tax incentives tend to encourage financing from private 
banks.  
27 Taken from Hanley, Shogren and White (2007, pp. 98-99), with modifications to the contents of 
ACt and MCt, as indicated in (8). In addition, the model is applied to a specific industry (i.e., the 
foundry industry). 
28 Here, well behaved cost functions are assumed and should be verified by empirical analysis. 
Additionally, a constant cost industry is assumed for simplicity. An increased or decreased cost 
industry assumption would not fundamentally change the result, because the distance between 
industry supply curves is constant, a point which seems to be critical.  
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indicated in the chart on the right. The most important point appears to be the minimum 
value of AC, which decides the industrial supply curve and output. A higher minimum 
AC value indicates a lower industrial output. Since Eq. (12) assumes g = gt, sti 
(industrial emissions with the tax) = cgt qti< si (industrial emissions without the tax) = 
cg qi (14), which means that the tax can decrease industrial emissions in the long run.  
 
Figure 1. Long-run impact of the tax (firm and industry level)  
0 
Pt 
MC 
qf=qtf 
MCt 
AC 
qi qti 
St 
S 
D 
ACt 
P 
 
However, in reality, the exit of firms from the foundry industry and the decrease in 
foundry production in Japan could be much more serious than that stated above, as more 
firms may exit due to negative economic profit. This is due to the power structure, in 
which user industries (e.g., the automobile industry) are much more powerful than the 
foundry industry, making price increases very difficult. Additionally, the lack of funds 
and low profit29 characteristics of the foundry industry are compounded by high energy 
prices. In addition, if the foundry industry suffers, the automobile industry suffers, and 
if the automobile industry suffers, so does the steel industry, creating a vicious circle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
29 Here, profit means accounting profit; economic profit should be even lower. 
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3.4.2 Possible impact of the subsidy 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the long-run impact of the subsidy in comparison with the tax30. As 
indicated by Eqs. (6), (7), (8), (9), (12) and (13), in the case of the subsidy, the marginal 
cost curve lies between MC and MCt. As Eq. (9) indicates, the subsidy shifts the 
average cost downward. Due to this shift, the entry of firms would take place until 
economic profit becomes zero, or ACv = Pv. Due to this entry, qvi (industrial output with 
the subsidy) would be larger than qi (industrial output without measures), as shown in 
chart on the right, although each firm would produce less output, as shown in the chart 
on the left. 
0 
Pt 
MC 
qf=qtf 
MCt 
AC 
P 
ACt 
qti qi 
MCv 
qvi qvf 
Pv 
ACv 
St 
S 
Sv 
D 
Figure 2. Long-run impact of the subsidy (firm level and industry level) compared to the 
CO2 tax 
 
However, a larger industrial output31 does not necessarily mean more emissions. 
As Eqs. (1), (12) and (13) and Fig. 3 indicate, if the effect of a production increase, due 
to a potentially small average cost decrease32, is outweighed by an improvement in 
                                                  
30 Baumol and Oats (1998, pp. 218-221) and Hanley, Shogren and White (2007, pp. 98-100). The 
main difference between these works is the location of MCv due to energy intensity improvement 
and the horizontal industry supply curve, which is only used by Hanley, Shogren and 
White.Additionally, the contents of ACv and MCv are different, as indicated in Eq. (9). 
31 This result is identical to both Baumol and Oats (1998, pp. 221) and Hanley, Shogren and White 
(2007, pp. 100). 
32 Komiya and Yokobori (1990) argued that “tax incentives have only very limited effects on cost 
conditions in the private sectors”. 
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energy intensity, it is possible that emissions can be reduced by the subsidy33.  
It might be argued that, given the serious deficit faced by the Japanese 
government, the introduction of subsidies would be difficult. However, if the subsidy 
contributes to boosting the economy by increasing investment, tax revenue increases 
could outweigh the increase in government costs. 
A common argument against subsidies is that they violate the 
polluters-pay-principle (PPP). However, it should be noted that foundry products must 
be produced somewhere, and that production in Japan would at least create the smallest 
amount of emissions.  
0 qti qi qvi 
si 
svi 
sti 
 
Figure 3. Possible emissions reductions with the subsidy 
 
3.4.3 Possible impact of emissions trading  
 
As indicated in the basic framework above, in the case of emissions trading, the event of 
compliance will be distinguished from the event of non-compliance as follows. 
  
3.4.3.1 Possible impact of emissions trading in the event of compliance 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the long-run impact of emissions trading (in the event of 
compliance) in comparison with the tax and the subsidy. Since gv = gc is assumed, the 
result is the same as that of the subsidy.  
Additionally, if the effect of production increase due to average cost decrease is 
                                                  
33 This is a major difference between Baumol and Oats (1998, pp. 221) and Hanley, Shogren and 
White (2007, pp. 100). 
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outweighed by improvements in energy intensity, there is the possibility of emissions 
reduction by emissions trading in the event of compliance, similar to that seen for the 
subsidy in Fig. 5. 
0 
Pt 
MC 
qf.tf 
MCt 
AC 
P 
ACt 
qti qi 
MCv.c 
Pv.c 
qvi.ci qvf.cf 
ACv.c 
St 
S 
Sv.c 
D 
Figure 4. Long-run impact of emissions trading (in the event of compliance) compared 
with the CO2 tax and the subsidy 
 
0 qti qi qvi.ci 
si 
s .ci vi
sti 
 
Figure 5. Possible emissions reduction with emissions trading in the event of 
compliance 
 
Therefore, emissions trading in the event of compliance might have the same 
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impact as the subsidy; Hongo (2008), for example, regards emissions trading as 
market-oriented subsidies. However, the expected serious difficulties in implementation 
stated in Sec. 3.2 should again be applied in this case.  
 
3.4.3.2 Possible impact of emissions trading in the event of non-compliance 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the long-run impact of emissions trading (in the event of non 
compliance) in comparison with other measures. Since gt = gn is assumed, MC is the 
same as that for the CO2 tax case, and, due to this charge, the average cost is shifted 
upward. 
However, the magnitude would be smaller, since the firm would be responsible for 
the excess only as indicated in Eqs. (8) and (11). Due to this shift, the exit of firms 
would take place until economic profit becomes zero, which means that ACn = Pn. As a 
result of this exit, qni (industrial output with the emissions trading in the event of 
non-compliance) would be smaller than qi (industrial output without measures) as 
indicated in chart on the right. Since Eq. (12) assumes g = gn, 
sn = cgn qni < si = cg qi                                                                          (15) 
0 
Pt 
MC MCt.n 
AC 
P 
ACt 
Sn 
D 
S 
St 
qti qi 
MCv.c 
ACv.c 
Pv.c Sv.c 
qvi.ci qvf.cf 
ACn 
qnf qf.tf qni 
Pn 
 
Figure 6. Long-run impact of emissions trading (in the event of non-compliance) in 
comparison with other measures 
 
when sn is industrial emissions with emissions trading in the event of non-compliance 
and si is industrial emissions without measures, indicating that emissions trading in the 
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event of non-compliance can decrease the foundry industry’s emissions in the long run.  
However, in reality, the exit of firms from the foundry industry and the 
decrease in foundry production could be even more serious than this result indicates. 
This is because many non-complying firms would be forced to exit due to the 
competition with complying firms resulting from the cost and price difference (i.e., the 
difference between Pn and Pc in Fig. 6). It should be noted that this exit would be more 
serious under benchmark method, because weak firms would be unable to comply, as 
described in Sec. 3.2. Additionally, the expected serious difficulties in implementation 
stated in Sec. 3.2 should again be applied. 
 
3.5 Global analysis of policy differences among countries 
3.5.1 Possible impact of a tax introduced only in industrialised countries 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the possible impact of a tax introduced only in industrialised 
countries. Script in is industrialized countries and script d is developing countries. Due 
to the cost and price difference illustrated by the difference between Pin and Pd, foundry  
industry in industrialised countries would disappear34. As a result, all foundry products 
0 
Pin 
MCd 
qdf=qinf 
MCin 
ACd 
qdi qini
Sin 
Sd 
D 
ACin 
Pd 
 
Figure 7. Possible impact of a tax introduced in industrialised countries only 
 
would be produced in developing countries. Although zero emissions would be realised 
                                                  
34 In reality, due to quality differences between industrialised and developing countries, at least 
some firms in industrialised countries would survive, especially in the area of high-quality products. 
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in industrialised countries, it might cause serious unemployment problems, The amount 
of global production is thus the same as that before the tax. 
However, in reality, global emissions would be increased, because it is reasonable 
to assume that both energy intensity and emissions coefficient are worse in developing 
countries due to lower levels of energy conservation technology and greater dependence 
on coal particularly in China and India, which together constitutes the majority of the 
developing world. 
 
3.5.2 Possible impact of subsides introduced in only part of the world 
 
Figure 8 illustrates a possible impact of a subsidy introduced in only part of the world35. 
Due to the cost and price difference illustrated by the difference between Pv and P, only 
foundry industries in countries where subsidies are introduced would survive36, while 
the amount of global production would increase. 
0 
MC 
qf 
AC 
P 
qi 
MCv 
qvi qvf 
Pv 
ACv 
S 
Sv 
D 
 
Figure 8. Possible impact of a subsidy introduced in only part of the world 
 
However, a larger industrial output does not necessary mean more emissions, as 
discussed in Sec. 3.4.2. If the effect of a production increase due to an average cost 
decrease is outweighed by improvements in energy intensity from the introduction of 
equipment technology, emissions can be reduced by a subsidy. Additionally, the most 
                                                  
35 The industrialised-developing distinction is not made here, because subsidies appear to be 
common to both types of countries. 
36 In reality, due to quality differences among countries, at least some firms in countries where 
subsidies are not introduced would survive, especially in the area of high-quality products.   
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advanced energy conservation technology for equipment could be introduced not only 
in industrialised countries but also in developing countries, which currently have much 
higher energy intensities than industrialised countries. As a result, dramatic global 
emission reduction is a possibility. It may be argued that, as a result of subsidy 
competition, only industries that receive huge amounts of subsidies would be able to 
survive. However, I tend to think that this would be unlikely, as it is widely considered 
among policy makers that huge amount of subsidies are ineffective, and because tax 
incentives have only very limited effects on cost conditions in the private sector (see 
Note 32). 
Concerning polluters-pay-principle (PPP), as argued in Sec. 3.4.2, foundry 
products must be produced somewhere, and the subsidy could contribute significantly to 
global emissions reduction. Thus, it may be preferable to encourage production by 
lower energy intensity producers using subsidies, which would ultimately contribute 
significantly to global emissions reduction.  
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3.5.3 Possible impact of emissions trading within the Kyoto framework 
 
For simplicity, the following assumptions were made:37 (1) Foundry industry firms in 
countries unable to reach Kyoto targets would not be compliant and (2) firms in 
countries able to reach Kyoto targets would be compliant, because allowances are likely 
to be more strict in countries that could not achieve these targets.  
Figure 9 illustrates the possible impact of emissions trading within the Kyoto 
framework. Due to the cost and price difference illustrated by the difference between Pn 
and PC, the foundry industries in non-compliant countries would disappear, and only 
those in compliant countries would survive38. Although the amount of global production 
would be increased, if the effect of production is outweighed by improvements in 
energy intensity, global emissions could be reduced by emissions trading. 
However, there would be very serious impacts on the foundry industries in 
non-compliant countries, among them unemployment. Additionally, the serious 
difficulties in implementation described in Sec. 3.3 would be expected.  
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Figure 9. Possible impact of emissions trading within the Kyoto framework 
 
 
 
                                                  
37 Countries not included in the Kyoto framework, which create the majority of global CO2 
emissions, were excluded from this analysis． 
38 In reality, due to quality differences among countries, at least some firms in countries not 
complying with the Kyoto Protocol would survive, especially in the area of high-quality products. 
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4. Summary and conclusions 
 
The long-run impact of a CO2 tax, subsidies for CO2 emissions reduction and CO2 
emissions trading on the foundry industry, both globally and domestically, was 
examined using partial equilibrium analysis. Significant findings were as follows. 
Although it would decrease domestic emissions, implementation of the CO2 tax 
could have serious impacts on the Japanese foundry industry. If the tax is introduced 
in industrialised countries only, it would increase global emissions and have serious 
impacts on the foundry industries in those countries. 
The subsidy could decrease emissions both domestically and globally without 
hurting foundry industries, and could improve their productivity by decreasing energy 
intensity.  
Emissions trading could theoretically work like a subsidy in the event of 
compliance and qualitatively work like a tax in the event of non-compliance. In the 
event of non-compliance, which is more likely to happen in the foundry industries in 
Kyoto non-compliant countries, serious impacts on the foundry industries would occur. 
Additionally, serious difficulties in implementation are expected.  
As indicated by s = cgq in Eq. (1), there are 3 ways to decrease CO2 emissions.  
The first way is to decrease foundry output (q). However, this appears extremely 
unlikely due to the high projected global economic growth in current developing 
countries39 which is expected to increase global automobile, 40 and thus foundry, 
production.  
The second way is to decrease the emission coefficient (c), which means fuel 
switching. However, most energy experts believe that this approach is limited. For 
example, overdependence on renewables might cause problems concerning energy 
security in foundry production.    
The third way is to decrease energy intensity (g). This method seems to be most 
effective and realistic, because it could also contribute to economic growth through 
improvements in foundry industry productivity and energy security.  
The subsidy for introducing energy conservation technology equipment to the 
foundry industry could contribute to the reduction of CO2 emissions, economic growth 
(both by productivity growth due to energy intensity improvement and increase in 
                                                  
39 Ito, Murota, Morita and Hoshino (2000, pp. 6) postulate that current developing countries will 
enjoy high growth in the long run. 
40 The research results of the IEEJ, in which I was involved in 1999, indicate that there is a strong 
correlation between per capita income and automobile diffusion rate in many countries. 
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investment in equipment technology), and energy security. 
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